This paper examines the potential for external conflicts in large, diversified business groups. On one hand, these groups are highly visible, facilitating the detection of opportunistic actions. Accordingly, reputation concerns should effectively constrain group behavior. On the other hand, these groups are highly complex, making it difficult for outsiders to unveil group strategies from among a myriad of transactions. This complexity should limit the power of reputation concerns to constrain actions. We use data on IPO initial returns to evaluate the trade-off between visibility and complexity. The evidence suggests that complexity dominates visibility, providing scope for opportunistic behavior against outside investors.
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Visibility versus complexity in business groups:
Evidence from Japanese keiretsu
I. Introduction
Business groups are found in numerous developed and emerging market economies including Brazil, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Mexico. In general, these corporate groups are characterized by diversified operations, extensive commercial and personnel links, cross-equity shareholdings, and mutual board representation. Some of the groups also include financial institutions that provide a broad range of financing and financial services to group members. The keiretsu industrial groups in Japan are the most commonly cited examples of bank-centered business groups, while the industrial groups in India are commonly cited examples of non-bank business groups.
Many papers have documented the benefits that these groups provide. Most argue that the groups provide a structure that overcomes some imperfection in the product, capital, or labor market.
1 On the other hand, recent research has identified and documented some drawbacks of large group governance systems. Most of this attention has focused on internal conflicts among group members.
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In the literature on business groups, however, very little attention has been paid to the potential for conflicts of interest between group firms and outside investors. One of the clearest examples of this type of conflict is when the group decides to take one of its firms public via an initial public offer (IPO). From a new, outside investor's perspective, the possibility that the group may be using the IPO to restructure the group or to engage in market timing represents a clear conflict of interest.
3 1 For example, see Aoki and Patrick (1994) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) for discussions of groups in Japan, Khanna and Palepu (1998) for India, Franks and Mayer for Germany (1994) , and Chan and Choi (1988) for Korea. 2 In Japan, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (1998) provide evidence that group banks are appropriating the benefits of their close ties with affiliated companies. In the US, Berger and Ofek (1995) , among others, find evidence that large, diversified firms are more likely to over-invest and to subsidize failing segments. 3 At least two papers investigate restructuring reasons for an IPO. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) argue that going public allows for the introduction of stock market monitoring, which should be viewed favorably by all investors. The second restructuring motive, discussed by Zingales (1995) , argues that IPOs are a means to divest assets. If investors view group membership as a beneficial condition, then they might fear that the IPO will be followed by
The lack of attention to potential conflicts of interest between groups and outside investors may be due to the belief that these large groups cannot afford to act opportunistically. Eventually, the market would detect opportunistic behavior and impose a reputation cost. Reputation concerns should thus constrain business groups from undertaking opportunistic behavior vis-à-vis external stakeholders.
Of course, reputation can prevent opportunistic behavior only if the market can detect an opportunistic act. 4 Indeed, business groups are highly visible. They often include the biggest firms in the country and their management is often made up of members of prominent families and/or expoliticians and government bureaucrats. Their high visibility leads to increased scrutiny and monitoring of group activities by, for example, analysts and the press. This visibility leads to the ready availability of information about group activities and thus increases the chances that outsiders will detect opportunistic acts.
Despite their visibility, the myriad of group related transactions might make it difficult for the market to infer an opportunistic act. In this paper, we call complexity all factors that might make it difficult to analyze the relation between one firm's actions and the group's overall strategy.
The complexity of business groups stems from several sources. Firms in these groups span numerous industries, while linkages across group firms occur at several levels (cross shareholdings, commercial ties, personnel swaps, joint business projects, and periodic meetings of the top executives). Gerlach (1992) , for example, describes in detail a "complex web" of interactions of the Japanese keiretsu. From an outsider's perspective, the group's internal workings are opaque and difficult to disentangle. 5 As a result, a high degree of uncertainty about the group's operations may exist, making it difficult for outside investors to decipher what is happening in group firms and to react accordingly.
the severing or weakening of the firm's ties to the group. The absence of such a possibility in the prospectus might then be viewed as a possible conflict of interest. The other IPO motive that entails a possible conflict of interest is market timing. The market timing motive is driven by managers who attempt to take advantage of "windows of opportunity" to get a particularly favorable price for the IPO shares (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995, p.1007) . 4 More precisely, reputation can enforce efficiency only if the market can statistically infer an opportunistic behavior from some observable measure. See, for instance, Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) . 5 For example, two of the authors worked as credit officers in overseas offices of New York money center banks during the 1980s (Asia and Latin America). The time and effort they spent analyzing the credit-worthiness of loans to group firms exceeded that spent on independent firms. In both banks, credit reports for loans to group-member firms included analyses of both firm and group-level data. The credit reports also discussed in detail the relation between the firm and the group. Separate group-level credit analyses were done annually by the most senior credit officers.
A trade-off between visibility and complexity thus exists in large diversified groups. On one hand, their high visibility increases the probability that outsiders will detect opportunistic acts, limiting the scope for opportunistic behavior in the first place. On the other hand, their complexity reduces the ability of analysts and outsiders to unveil corporate strategies among a myriad of transactions. Detection of opportunistic behavior is then more difficult and reputation concerns are less likely to effectively constrain such actions.
This paper provides evidence on the relative impact of visibility versus complexity on the cost of issuing new capital of large and diversified corporate groups. To do this, we look at one of the best examples of highly visible and complex diversified groups: the Japanese keiretsu. We compare returns for initial public offers (IPOs) of Japanese keiretsu group firms with returns for
IPOs of independent Japanese firms. We look at IPO returns because, as we shall argue, they are uniquely suited to provide evidence on the trade-off between complexity and visibility.
An extensive body of theoretical and empirical research has established a link between the level of initial returns in IPOs and the degree of uncertainty about the value of the IPO firm. 6 In this literature, higher initial returns are associated with higher levels of uncertainty. Our null hypothesis is that, all else equal, initial returns for IPOs of firms related to keiretsu groups and for independent firms should be equal. The two opposing forces of visibility and complexity suggest two alternative hypotheses. If relatively high group visibility reduces uncertainty, then there should be relatively lower initial returns for the keiretsu-linked IPOs than for the independent IPOs. If, on the other hand, complexity increases uncertainty about the group firms, then we should find relatively higher initial returns for the keiretsu-related IPOs.
We conduct our research with a sample of all Tokyo Stock Exchange IPOs over 1981-94.
Of the 159 IPOs that occurred over this period, 74 were of firms linked to a keiretsu industrial group (52 to the 6 largest horizontal keiretsu and 22 to vertical keiretsu), while 85 were of independent Japanese firms . With these IPOs we conduct a series of tests to examine whether and how group membership affects returns. First, controlling for factors that might affect uncertainty at the firm level, we find that initial returns for IPOs of firms linked to the horizontal keiretsu groups are higher than for independent firms. Second, we examine the pattern of returns cross sectionally.
Finally, we look at some alternative explanations for the results.
6 See Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) for a review of the IPO literature and Beatty and Ritter (1986) for the link between uncertainty and initial returns. This link is discussed in section II of the paper.
The data consistently indicate that, despite the high visibility and close scrutiny of business groups, complexity creates scope for opportunistic behavior. This result suggests that reputation concerns may not effectively constrain group actions. Our findings parallel those in Kroszner and Rajan (1997) who examine banking structure in the US prior to the Glass-Steagall Act. Like them, we provide evidence that "organizational structure can influence a firm's credibility and effectiveness" (p. 511). In our case, group membership can affect the cost of issuing new capital through an individual firm's relation with outside investors.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II we develop our hypotheses. In section III we describe the data and provide some summary statistics. In section IV we test our hypotheses and in section V we conclude.
II. Hypotheses
Rock (1986) argues that the widely documented high initial returns in IPOs around the world are a market response to asymmetric information among the bidders. The existence of informed and uninformed bidders sets up a situation where information about the offer has value.
The uninformed bidders face a winner's curse where they have a higher probability of buying IPO shares when they are overvalued. In order to assure participation of uninformed bidders, an unconditional expected initial return must be implicit in the IPO price. Of course, the bigger the uncertainty on the firm's value, the larger the potential loss of an uninformed bidder in the IPO.
Hence, as Beatty and Ritter point out (1986) , higher initial returns are associated with higher levels of uncertainty about the firm's operations.
In principle, outside investors do not know if an IPO is favorably priced. However, if outsiders can easily detect opportunistic acts, then reputation concerns should constrain unfair pricing in IPOs. Private information about a possible opportunistic motive for the IPO is valueless because the market knows that the probability of that opportunistic event is very small due to reputation constraints. From Beatty and Ritter (1986) , the initial returns should barely respond to this highly unlikely opportunistic event.
Opportunistic behavior in IPOs may be present in all firms, group related or independent.
We argue that the relatively high visibility of keiretsu-linked firms might significantly reduce their scope for opportunistic behavior vis-à-vis less visible independent firms (the benchmark for our tests). Accordingly, visibility considerations alone should dictate lower returns for the keiretsu IPOs. We also argue, though, that the relatively high complexity of the keiretsu groups might make reputation a less effective mechanism against opportunistic behavior, leading to higher levels of uncertainty, and returns, for the keiretsu-linked IPOs. Hence, by comparing the IPO returns of independent and keiretsu linked IPOs we obtain a metric for the trade-off between visibility and complexity in large diversified groups.
Japan's corporate governance structures provide a good testing ground for this experiment because there are big dichotomies in the levels of visibility and complexity among relatively easily identifiable sets of firms. In general, almost all firms in Japan have close links with a main bank and extensive ties with their suppliers and distributors. The formality, depth, and breadth of these ties, however, differ depending on whether the firm is part of a horizontal keiretsu, a vertical keiretsu, or an independent firm. At the same time, the firms in horizontal keiretsu have extensive ties across directors, equity shareholdings, bank borrowing, and product trade. Gerlach (1992) finds that across the 6 7 See Gerlach (1992) for a detailed discussion of the keiretsu form of industrial organization. 8 Research suggests that the keiretsu groups provide substantial support to group members in times of financial distress. The implicit group guaranty should further reduce the uncertainty surrounding these offers. See Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) for an example of research on keiretsu support during financial distress. This story of an implicit guaranty reducing uncertainty is similar in spirit to James and Weir (1990) who suggest that the existence of a bank borrowing relationship should reduce ex ante uncertainty about the value of a firm's equity.
largest keiretsu groups, 34 percent of debt, 44 percent of equity, 45 percent of directorships, and 11 percent of trade are from related group firms. 9 The horizontal, and to a lesser extent the vertical keiretsu, are complicated, amorphous, organizational forms, making it difficult for outsiders to decipher the goals and strategies of individual firms. The Rock model would predict that the greater uncertainty caused by this complexity would induce higher initial returns for the keiretsurelated IPOs.
Another implication of the trade-off between visibility and complexity in group firms concerns the ease or speed with which a market price is set immediately following the IPO. Ritter (1984) and Beatty and Ritter (1986, footnote 13) argue that the standard deviation of returns in the immediate post-issue market is a good proxy for the level of ex ante uncertainty about the firm's value. If complexity creates more uncertainty for the group related IPOs, then we would expect the standard deviation of returns to be relatively higher for them than for the independent firms. If visibility lowers uncertainty, then we would expect relatively lower variability in returns for the group related IPOs.
Besides providing distinct sets of firms with varying levels of visibility and complexity, Japan is a good testing ground for our inquiry for another reason. During our sample period, Japan changed the way IPO prices are set. Three different pricing regimes have existed. 10 In the first regime, prior to May 1988, the investment firm calculates the fixed IPO offer price from a formula based on pricing of comparable companies. 11 The opening trading price is subject to price limits, with no trades until the price is within the allowed range. 12 In the second regime, from May 1988 through March 1989, the offer price is set in the same manner, but the upper price limits on trading are removed. In the third regime, in effect since April 1989, a portion of the IPO shares is first They find that initial returns in IPOs of firms with previous bank borrowing relationships are lower than those in other IPOs. 9 Gerlach (1992) , page 158. The debt and equity numbers are calculated as a percent of the top 10 providers for 1986. The directorship and trade ties are for 1980. 10 See Pettway and Kaneko (1996) for a more detailed description of the different IPO pricing regimes, and a test of their impact on IPO pricing. 11 During this period, the Japanese investment companies followed the "subscription method" of selling IPOs as used in the UK, not the "underwriting method" used in the US. A Japanese investment company is more passive and does not conduct "book building" or "road shows" that are common in the US. They primarily take subscriptions for the new issues, allocating shares on a first-come, first-serve basis. 12 These price limits will result in delays in the first market trade if no sellers exist at the upper limit of the allowed trading range.
offered in a price discriminatory auction. 13 Following this auction, the fixed offer price to the nonauction investors is set as a function of the weighted-average price of the successful auction bids.
The new rules also limit participation in the auction and subsequent share sale by excluding all individuals or companies that have an existing equity, debt, or working (directly or via a relative) relationship with the IPO firm.
The link between the level of uncertainty and initial returns should be stronger in fixedprice share sales than in auctions. In auctions, information is revealed to the non-auction investors during the price setting process, reducing uncertainty for all IPO investors. Studies in France and
Portugal show that initial returns for auction based IPOs can be as much as 2 to 4 times lower than for fixed-price IPOs. 14 In addition, the restrictions on related-firm participation in regime 3 should greatly reduce the winner's curse in the keiretsu IPOs by removing related group firms from the set of potential bidders.
The shift in pricing methods suggests that, at a minimum, we need to control for the regime changes in our tests. The switch to an auction should lower initial returns for all IPOs. Moreover, we can use these changes to further examine the impact of group complexity. If complexity makes keiretsu IPOs more prone to opportunistic behavior than IPOs of independent firms, then keiretsu IPOs should benefit the most from an auction process that reveals private information to the nonauction purchasers. Accordingly, horizontal keiretsu returns should fall more, in an absolute sense, than vertical and independent firm returns in the later period.
III. Data description
Our IPO sample is taken from Pettway and Kaneko (1995) . They provide data on the offer price, the closing price on the first day of trading, and the name of the lead underwriter of the issue. The sample includes all IPOs of private firms that subsequently listed on the first or second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) over 1981 through June, 1994. 15 Because our hypotheses specifically relate to large, visible group-related IPOs, we only look at IPOs on the 13 The auction allocates shares to the highest bidder first, then to the second highest, etc. All investors are limited to 5,000 shares in both the auction and the subsequent fixed price share sale. 14 See Leleux and Paliard (1996) for France, and a Loughran, Ritter and Rydquist (1994) reference to an unpublished Portugal study done by Alpalhao (1992) . 15 Note that the TSE market generally moved up during the early period of the study and peaked in December of 1989. Then it declined to the end of the data set. Therefore, the data are taken across periods of both rising and first or second section of the TSE. In the early 1990s, over 85% of equity trading volume in Japan was on the TSE (Berlin 1990 Panel B provides a frequency table, splitting the independent, horizontal, and vertical keiretsu firms across the three different IPO pricing regimes. The panel indicates that the independent firm IPOs appear to be relatively concentrated in the first part of the sample period.
However, a chi-square test cannot reject independence of the three firm types across the regime distribution at the 5 percent level.
IV. Empirical Tests
IV. A. Horizontal Versus Independent Firm IPOs
We begin by comparing IPOs for horizontal keiretsu versus independent firms. We look at the standard deviation of returns over the first 20 days of trading and at the initial returns. Sample statistics and tests of differences are provided in exclude NEC System from the sample, it does affect some of the inferences, so we report results without this firm, and discuss in the text the most relevant effects of including the outlier in the sample.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that, over the entire period, the mean standard deviation of stock returns over the first 20 days of trading following the IPO of the horizontal keiretsu firms exceeds that of the independent firms by approximately 20 percent. This difference is significant at the 5 percent level. The mean standard deviation for the keiretsu linked firms is higher than the independent firm standard deviation in all sub-periods, although the difference is no longer significant due to the loss of power in the small sub-samples. If we accept the standard deviation of returns as a proxy for ex ante uncertainty as in Ritter (1984) , then the data indicate that the keiretsu linked IPOs are riskier than the independent ones, as would be case if complexity dominates visibility in group related IPOs.
Accordingly, Beatty and Ritter (1986) would predict a higher level of initial returns for the keiretsu linked IPOs. Panel B of Table 3 shows that the one-day mean returns for the horizontal keiretsu IPOs (50.8 percent) are 8.6 percentage points higher than the independent firm returns (42.2 percent). This difference, however, is not statistically significant, see the p-value of (.369) in the far right column. 19 These means are considerably higher than the mean IPO returns reported in US studies of 15.3 percent (Ibbotson and Ritter 1995, 
In the IPO literature, it is common practice to include a control for firm size in regressions on initial returns. Ritter (1984) shows that initial returns are negatively related to the size of the issuing firm. He argues that these results are consistent with IPO models that suggest IPO returns should be positively related to the level of uncertainty regarding the value of the offer. From our perspective, size, measured with Log(sales), is a proxy for visibility at the firm level. Higher firm-level visibility should be associated with lower returns.
We also include a proxy for firm-level complexity. This proxy, Industries, measures diversity at the firm. Japan Company Handbook provides a percentage breakdown of each firm's revenues. We use the breakdown at the time of the IPO to count the number of industries that comprise greater than or equal to 10 percent of sales of the IPO firm. This number ranges from 1 to 4, with a mean level of 2.03 for independents, 2.17 for horizontal firms, and 2.27 for vertical firms. The more industries a firm is involved in, the more difficult it should be for outsiders to analyze its prospects. As firm-level complexity goes up, we expect to see higher returns to reflect the greater uncertainty about firm value.
The critical test for us is whether group membership, per se, provides any explanatory power for initial returns beyond the firm's characteristics described above. Is group membership priced and which effect, visibility versus complexity, dominates? We conduct this test with Horizontal, a dummy variable set equal to 1 for IPOs of firms that are linked to the 6 largest horizontal keiretsu groups. An insignificant coefficient estimate for Horizontal would be consistent 20 We also perform a Wilcoxon rank sum non-parametric test on the full sample of returns. We cannot reject that the horizontal and independent firm returns come from the same distribution for the full sample period or for regimes 2 and 3. But, for regime 1, we reject that they come from the same sample at the five percent level.
with our null hypothesis of no differences in returns. A significant negative coefficient estimate would be consistent with the visibility of the groups lowering overall uncertainty, while a significant positive coefficient estimate would be consistent with group complexity raising overall uncertainty.
We conduct separate regressions on IPOs issued during the first fixed-price pricing regime and the third auction pricing regime. The data in table 3 and the discussion above all indicate that the pricing regimes should be treated separately. We do not report results for regime 2 alone due to the small sample size (N=17) and Pettway and Kaneko's (1996) argument that regime 2 was viewed as a transition period.
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The regressions reported in table 4 are OLS where the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity as in White (1980) . We report results for regressions that exclude the outlier, NEC System. In general, the point estimates for the Horizontal coefficient are higher, but significance levels are approximately the same, when this firm's results are included.
The Model I and II regressions include only those IPOs issued during regime 1. The
Model I regression includes only our basic control variables, while Model II adds in the
Horizontal dummy coefficient to test whether group membership has any effect on returns. In both Models, the firm-specific controls are significant and consistent with our hypotheses of firm-level visibility lowering uncertainty and returns and firm-level complexity raising uncertainty and returns. Log(sales) is negative and significant at the five percent level, while Industries is positive and significant at the ten or five percent levels. In Model II the Horizontal dummy is significant at ten percent and quite large at .263, supporting the hypothesis that complexity dominates visibility at the group level.
The Model III and IV specifications parallel I and II for the IPOs in regime 3 when prices are set by auction. In Model IV, the Horizontal dummy remains positive and significant at the ten percent level, indicating that group complexity may still affect returns in an auction setting. The point estimate of .131 is one-half the size of the Horizontal estimate in regime 1 (Model II) consistent with the auction mechanism leading to a reduction in the impact of complexity.
An intriguing result in models III and IV is the negative and significant coefficient estimates for Industries. This suggests that the more diversified firms had lower returns in this regime.
Closer investigation of the regime 3 IPOs reveals that this effect lies entirely with the Independent firms. In fact, the result is driven by a concentration of financial firm IPOs in this period (9 of the 22 independent firm IPOs in regime 3 are for financial firms). Consistent with US results in Ritter (1991), these financial firm IPOs have relatively low initial returns and, in regime 3, they have a relatively higher number of industries (2.0 compared with 1.5 for the other 13 independent firm IPOs). The combination of relatively low returns with a higher number of industries is driving the negative Industries coefficients in Models III and IV.
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In sum, the table 4 results indicate that, controlling for the pricing regime and firm-level visibility and complexity, 23 the keiretsu-linked IPOs have higher initial returns than the independent IPOs, a result consistent with complexity dominating visibility.
IV.B. Vertical Keiretsu IPOs
We also examine the visibility/complexity tradeoff by looking at the IPOs of firms from the vertical keiretsu. Based on the work of Prowse (1992) , Gerlach (1992) , and Bergloff and Perotti (1994) , we assume that there is a spectrum of visibility and complexity in Japan's corporate governance systems. The horizontal groups are the most visible and the most complex, while the independent firms are the least visible and complex, with the vertical keiretsu falling in between.
The standard deviation of returns in the first 20 days of trading after the IPO, our proxy for ex ante uncertainty of firm value, are never significantly different for vertical versus horizontal or for vertical versus independent comparisons (results not reported). Still, over the entire period, the point estimates indicate that the mean standard deviation of returns for the horizontal keiretsu IPOs is 20 percent higher than the vertical IPOs, while the vertical mean is 1.5 percent higher than the independent firm mean. These results provide weak evidence of relatively more uncertainty for the horizontal than for the vertical IPOs.
22 If we include a binary identifier for the financial firms, the Industries coefficient is no longer significant in Model III and has a p-value of (.095) in Model IV. 23 We have also conducted these tests with alternative proxies for firm-and group-level visibility and complexity. We use firm age as an alternative proxy for firm visibility, the tightness of the group link as an alternative proxy for firm complexity, and the number of industries listed for each group (horizontal or vertical) in the Industrial Groupings in Japan as a proxy for group-level diversity. While the two additional firm-level proxies are never significant in regressions, we do get weak evidence that complexity is relevant at the group level. Table 5 provides the mean initial returns and tests of differences for the vertical keiretsu relative to the horizontal keiretsu and independent firms. Over the full period, the less complex vertical keiretsu-related IPOs actually had the lowest mean initial returns, 31.6 percent. We reject equality of the horizontal and vertical keiretsu mean returns at the 5 percent level in the regime 1 and ten percent level in regime 3. In Wilcoxon rank sum tests, we do not reject that the horizontal and vertical returns come from the same sample for the full period or for regime 2 or 3. We do reject that they come from the same sample for regime 1 at the ten percent level. Thus, we find evidence that the relatively higher complexity of the horizontal keiretsu increases their cost of issuing new capital vis-à-vis the vertical keiretsu.
Arguably, the vertical keiretsu are not significantly more complex than independent firms.
In table 5, we never reject equality of the vertical and independent returns. Wilcoxon rank sum tests also never reject that the vertical and independent returns come from the same distribution.
When we run regressions parallel to those in table 4 on the vertical and independent IPOs, including a binary identifier for the vertical firms, we never reject that the Vertical dummy equals zero. Thus, we have no evidence of a significant difference between the vertical and independent firm IPO returns. Table 6 is parallel in format to table 4, providing the results of regressions with the horizontal and vertical IPOs. The results indicate that the horizontal returns exceed the vertical returns in regime 1. The Horizontal coefficient point estimates are again quite large, 0.350 in regime 1. The Log(sales) coefficients are again negative, but never significant, while the Industries coefficient estimates are positive for regime 1 and negative for regime 3, but also neither statistically nor economically significant.
The horizontal versus vertical results in tables 5 and 6 provide evidence that the impact of complexity may be driven by the scope of operations and the span of industries. The internal workings of all keiretsu groups are somewhat opaque, yet the six largest horizontal keiretsu are significantly larger than the vertical groups and they span numerous industries.
IV. C. Tests of alternative explanations
So far, we have shown that, controlling for firm-level characteristics and the pricing regime, initial IPO returns of horizontal keiretsu-related firms exceed returns for vertical keiretsurelated and independent firms. These results are consistent with the complexity of group operations dominating their high visibility, leading to increased uncertainty about the IPO firms.
There is, of course, the possibility that something else may be driving the results. One possibility is industry mix. Perhaps the keiretsu IPOs, particularly in the early period, are concentrated in industries with relatively high returns. Table 1 , however, shows that the mix of IPOs across industries is similar for the three sets of firms. Nevertheless, Ritter (1991) provides some evidence for the US that financial firm IPO returns are significantly lower than for other industries.
Table 1 does show that there are 18 financial firm IPOs in the independent sub-set (21.1 percent), compared to only 5 (9.6 percent) for the horizontal IPOs and 3 (13.6 percent) for the vertical IPOs.
Relatively lower returns for the independents could be due to a relatively high concentration of financial firm IPOs. When we include a dummy variable for financial firms into our horizontal and independent firm regressions in table 4, its coefficient estimate is negative and significant in Models I through III, and negative but insignificant in Model IV. The other results basically hold.
The point estimates for the Horizontal coefficient fall from .263 (p-value of .074) to .249 (.087) in regime 1 and from .131 (.071) to .100 (.192) in regime 3.
A former investment banker in Japan suggested that the keiretsu returns are higher, particularly in the early period, because the groups realized that they were going to issue numerous
IPOs. As such, they wanted initial investors to have positive returns, thus encouraging participation in later offers. This type of argument is encompassed in signaling models such as Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) . In these models, issuers signal high quality with a low IPO offer price. This cost is recouped via retained shares and subsequent issues. This story, however, does not explain the difference in returns between horizontal and vertical keiretsu IPOs.
Presumably, both sets of groups were going to take multiple firms public. In addition, if we regress the horizontal keiretsu returns from regime 1 against a constant and a linear trend indexing the order of IPOs for each group, the coefficient estimate for the trend term is positive and significant at the ten percent level, .035 (p-value of .066). Rising returns over the period are inconsistent with the repeated offer story.
Two other possible explanations for these results lie with the underwriter. Carter and Manaster (1990) and Michaely and Shaw (1994) provide evidence that initial IPO returns in the US are lower when the firm is taken public by an underwriter with a high quality reputation. In Japan, one investment bank, Nomura, stands out from all others. Nomura is not related to any keiretsu group. In the early 1990s, it accounted for approximately one-fifth of all security firm revenues, and had almost 50 percent more revenue than the next largest securities firm (Industrial Groupings in Japan 1992/93) . Perhaps the independent and vertical keiretsu firm IPO returns are lower because they use Nomura more often than the horizontal keiretsu firms.
In our sample, the independent and horizontal keiretsu firms use Nomura for approximately 25 percent of their IPOs, while the vertical keiretsu rely on Nomura for 55 percent of their offers.
When a dummy variable, set equal to one for IPOs underwritten by Nomura, is included in the regressions with vertical keiretsu, however, it is never significant and the other coefficient estimates are not materially affected. Interestingly, when a Nomura dummy is included in the table 4 regressions, with the horizontal keiretsu and independent firms, its coefficient estimate is negative and significant at the five percent level in regime one. The point estimates for the Horizontal coefficients in the regressions stay approximately the same when a Nomura dummy is included, but their significance levels fall from (.074) to (.089) in regime 1 and from (.071) to (.076) in regime 3. Even though Nomura does provide some explanatory power for initial returns of the horizontal keiretsu and independent IPOs, the basic result of relatively high horizontal keiretsu returns still holds.
The other underwriter explanation for the relatively high returns of horizontal keiretsurelated IPOs concerns the use of related underwriters. Approximately 28% of the horizontal keiretsu IPOs are brought to the market by securities houses from the same group. Gompers and Lerner (1997) look at bank underwriting in the US when the bank holds a prior financial claim via a venture capital subsidiary. 24 They argue that related underwriters pose a conflict of interest and therefore might be associated with higher initial returns. 25 The use of a related underwriter might facilitate opportunistic behavior, expanding the winner's curse problem for uninformed bidders, and leading to the need for higher expected initial returns. When we include a dummy variable set equal to one for those IPOs issued by related underwriters in the regressions with horizontal keiretsu firms in tables 4 and 6, however, the coefficient estimates are never significant at the ten percent level. In these specifications, the Horizontal coefficient estimates stay approximately the same, but the significance levels fall slightly (for example, from (.071) to (.115) in We conclude, then, that our findings are robust to size, firm-level complexity, pricing method, industry, deliberate underpricing, underwriter reputation and underwriter links.
V. Conclusion
This paper explores the cost of issuing new capital in the Japanese keiretsu groups. We examine whether or not the complexity of these groups outweighs their high visibility and intense scrutiny, leading to uncertainties that could reduce the effectiveness of reputation concerns in constraining opportunistic behavior against outside investors.
We find that the initial returns for IPOs of firms related to the six largest horizontal keiretsu groups are significantly higher than the initial returns for independent firms and for firms related to vertical keiretsu. These results hold when we control for changes in the pricing regimes and for firm size and complexity. We also find that differences in returns between the groups are larger when shares are sold with fixed prices during regime 1, exactly when we would expect complexity to have a higher impact on returns, rather than when prices are set via an auction during regime 3.
We find little evidence that the results are due to industry mix, deliberate underpricing, underwriter reputation or underwriter links with the group.
The findings are consistent with the complex and opaque nature of the horizontal keiretsu groups outweighing their high visibility and close scrutiny. The inability of outsiders to easily discern group strategies suggests that reputation concerns will not serve as an effective check on group or firm behavior. As a result, the potential for agency conflicts between firms in large, diversified business groups and outside investors may be relevant and significant. NOTE. --Sample includes returns on IPOs of firms that are traded on the first or second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1981 through June, 1994, excluding NEC System. Regime 1 includes IPOs issues over 1/1/81 through 4/30/88, regime 2 5/1/88 through 3/31/89, and regime 3 4/1/89 through 6/30/94. Horizontal Keiretsu includes firms that belong to one of the 6 largest horizontal keiretsu groups. Firms that do not belong to any keiretsu group are classified as Independent. Standard deviations are calculated from stock returns over the first 20 days of trading following the IPO. Initial Returns are calculated as the percentage change from the fixed offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading. The data come from the University of Rhode Island's PACAP Data Base. p-values are for a test of whether the average value or the difference is zero. NOTE. --Sample includes returns on IPOs of firms that are traded on the first or second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1981 through June, 1994, excluding NEC System. Horizontal Keiretsu includes firms that belong to one of the 6 largest horizontal keiretsu groups: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB, and Sanwa. Vertical Keiretsu includes firms that belong to a vertical keiretsu group or one of the small horizontal keiretsu (3 firms). Firms that do not belong to any keiretsu group are classified as Independent. The first number in each cell is the simple average over the sample, the number in brackets is the median, and the number in parentheses is the p-value for a test of whether the average in the cell is zero. 
